No Love for Contingency Contractor

In the combined cases of In Re Estate of Lujan and In Re Estate of Gulick (click on name to read opinion), the Court of Appeals upholds the trial court’s decision that a third-party contractor, Probate Asset Recovery LLC (“PAR”), is not entitled to a contingency fee for finding abandoned real properties (which have equity value) and for bringing that information to the attention of the Public Administrator. It’s a lengthy decision, and unpublished.

Essentially, PAR claims it is doing a public service by finding homes that need probate administration and notifying the PA before the property goes into foreclosure. PAR argues that a 1/3 contingency of the equity in such properties is fair compensation because their business model requires them to investigate many homes that turn out to be not worth pursuing for every home that they find which justifies opening an estate.  PAR says that if they can’t operate in this manner, they will go out of business and the solvent homes they now find will end up foreclosed, and Michigan families will lose out.

The COA counters that: Only lawyers are authorized to get paid contingency fees, and your business model isn’t our problem. Rather the trial court’s job is to look at what the reasonable value of your services were with respect to the property of this estate.  In these cases, the trial court determined that the reasonable value of your services was $45 per hour, and that decision is affirmed.

This Wayne County case comes in the context of significant bad publicity surrounding public administrators in the Metro Detroit area, and PAR’s role in particular. That context may have something – perhaps a lot – to do with the outcome and tone of this decision.  (To see one such report involving PAR and this issue, click here.)

For our purposes, the case would be helpful in situations in which a beneficiary is challenging the fees paid to a non-lawyer agent. In addition to affirming the rule that such arrangements need to be reasonable, this case provides support for the propositions that: (1) the trial court can directly reform contracts between the PR and the non-lawyer agent; and (2) in determining reasonableness of such arrangements, the trial court only concerns itself with the value provided to the estate and not the agent’s business model or public utility.

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Lost Wills – A Tough Row to Hoe

This juicy little soap opera out of Battle Creek starts where so many of such tales begin:  Dad is married but his children are from a prior relationship.  Then Dad dies.

Daughter Brooke actually goes through the pockets of the dead man looking for the keys to the gun safe where he kept his will – but too late!

The Court of Appeals describes the scene as follows:

Brooke Barksdale noted that when she arrived at the decedent’s home at approximately 11 a.m. on the day of the decedent’s death, petitioner’s son, Shawn, tried to stop her as Brooke Barksdale went to see the decedent’s body, and when she looked in the decedent’s pants pocket for his car keys, which also contained the keys to the gun safe, she could not find them.

And, upon further investigation, she sees that the door to the gun safe (which he always kept locked) stands open.  Before she can further investigate, Wife tells her to leave. Classic!

Wife petitions to open an estate intestate.  Kids counter with petition to admit a lost will.  Wife brings motion for summary disposition.  Kids submit affidavits of themselves and others that aver that Dad had a will he kept in the gun safe.  It named Brooke as Personal Representative.  The house went to Brian and the rest was distributed among his kids and grandkids in unknown proportions.  They aver that Dad discussed the will with them on numerous occasions, that he kept it locked in his gun safe, and that he had it out when he had Brooke sign various other legal documents related to his affairs.  They further aver that Wife was present during some of these conversations and that she verbally acknowledged the will’s existence on at least one occasion.

Trial Court grants summary disposition to Wife, saying that the proffered testimony is insufficient to withstand summary disposition because there is no evidence that the will was executed in conformity with the requirements of a valid will or holographic will under MCL 700.2502, or that it could be admitted as document intended to be a will under MCL 700.2503; and further that the terms remain too sketchy even with the recitations of the kids to meet their burden.  MCL 700.3402, MCL 700.3407.  Court of Appeals affirms.

The case is unpublished, so take it for what it’s worth.  And I think that what it is worth is that it sheds light on the challenges of probating a lost will when no copy can be found.

Takeaways from this case:

1.    Admitting a lost will when there is no draft or copy to be found is a tough row to hoe.

2.    It’s a good idea to keep your will someplace where people who might want to destroy it can’t do so after you die or become incompetent.

Read In Re Estate of Stuart Alister Warner by clicking on the name.  

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Storm Clouds in Elder Law Land

It seems to me that we are living through what could be a case study on the way the law evolves to address a rapidly changing social environment. More people are living longer.  More people are experiencing age-related cognitive impairments.  At the same time family dysfunction seems to be the rule, not the exception.

As a result, the law in the arena of adult guardianships and conservatorships is experiencing stress and litigants are experiencing a high degree of instability with respect to the process and outcomes in the trial courts. Trial courts hardly know what to do with these cases. They need clearer direction.  The issues that are coming up are difficult and deeply personal, factually unique in each case.  The laws only offer general guidelines about how to resolve these conflicts.  It is time for our appellate courts to figure out how these laws can best be construed to provide just results notwithstanding the complex issues, and to make practical compromises to allow the system to work in larger counties. More laws, I think, are not the answer.

My thoughts on this topic were triggered by a recent unpublished opinion, In re Conservatorship of Janet Kapp (click on the name to read the case). The case itself is insignificant, but offers a good example of the issues that commonly arise in these matters – both in terms of the facts that are coming into court, and the legal challenges that trial courts are struggling to address.  But the problem has been festering for some time.  In fact, I wrote an article for the State Bar Journal several years ago on the topic: Adult Guardianships, the New Divorce (click on the name to read the article).  It was evident then that we were facing a storm, now it seems the storm has arrived.

The issues include:

What does a Court have to do before passing over a family member with priority and appointing a professional fiduciary?

What role does family dysfunction play in this decision? Is it good enough for the trial judge to say: “You all can’t get along, so I’m appointing someone from outside the family”?

What role does alienation of affection play? Where a family member keeps other family members away, is that per se a basis for passing over that family member, or must a court look into whether that decision is rationally based? [On this point it is interesting that legislation is being proposed to create a process to address family visitation rights for vulnerable adults.  Click here to read that proposed legislation.  I personally see this effort as well-meaning but misguided.  We don’t need more laws, and the process proposed by the legislation is, to my mind, unworkable.  Trial courts have this power now (click here to see blog post Seeing Redd, for instance).]

What role do existing estate planning documents play? In this new Kapp case we see the trial court simply blowing past the existing documents, based on a Guardian ad Litem’s conclusion that the older adults were probably impaired when they were signed.  Is that ok?

How much discretion do trial courts have in this context to avoid holding an evidentiary hearing?

In numerous unpublished opinions, the Court of Appeals has been all over the board on all of these issues. As for published opinions, in the last three years alone we have seen wild fluctuations from, for instance, the Bittner case (click here to read Bittner’s Bite) to the rather incredible legal conclusions reached in Brody (click here to read Another Brody Bombshell).  Trial courts need guidance, but we need to appreciate this guidance has to allow for practical implementation – a workable system.  It is one thing for an experienced and engaged trial judge in a small county to hold a two day (or more) trial on the issue of suitability, and another thing to tell larger counties with busy dockets and a high percentage of pro per litigants to do the same.

Some help may be coming. The Michigan Supreme Court has agreed to take up Brody, and the Probate Section of the State Bar has been approved to file an Amicus Brief (proud to say that Chalgian and Tripp has been retained by the Section to prepare that brief).  But I wouldn’t expect too much.  While this case opens the door to the MSC to address many of these issues, they are likely to offer only some direction on the narrow issues in the appeal.

Finally, there’s an old saying: “May you live in interesting times,” and I’ve always felt that one of the things I enjoy about my chosen practice area is that it’s changing so rapidly, and the law is struggling to keep up – which makes for interesting times indeed for those of us who work with aging issues and vulnerable adult exploitation in particular. But when I looked up the saying on Wikipedia, I found this explanation of the saying, which suggests I may want to temper my enthusiasm:

“May you live in interesting times” is an English expression purported to be a translation of a traditional Chinese curse. While seemingly a blessing, the expression is always normally used ironically, with the clear implication that ‘uninteresting times’ of peace and tranquillity are more life-enhancing than interesting ones, which from historical perspective usually include disorder and conflict.

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POST Set to Join Michigan’s Medical Directive Stew

When it comes to medical care advance directives, we Michiganders have patient advocate designations, advance directives, and do not resuscitate orders. Soon, it appears, we will also have POST forms.  Laws requiring the development of, and allowing for the use of, POST (or Physician’s Order for Scope of Treatment) forms in Michigan have now been passed by both houses and are awaiting the anticipated signature of Governor Snyder.  UPDATE:  The Governor has approved these bills.  The law has an effective date of February 6, 2018.

A POST form is a document that would be signed by a patient and their doctor which would provide direction for the treatment of a specific condition, which direction could include end-of-life choices. The expressions in the form would continue to have effect even if the patient subsequently becomes unable to make their own medical decisions.

A POST form differs significantly from a patient advocate designation or advance directive in that a person may not unilaterally create them. They are created by the patient in consultation with their medical care provider.

Waiting for It. Once these new bills are signed into law, State agencies will initiate a process to develop a standardized form. The use of POST forms will be delayed until that process is complete.  This process could take years.

Let’s look at the soon-to-be new law:

  • A guardian and a patient advocate will have authority to create a POST form for a person who is unable to make their own healthcare choices.
  • A POST form remains revocable by the patient or their representative (PAD or Guardian). A patient may revoke a POST form orally or in writing.
  • If a patient has a pre-existing patient advocate designation that includes an advance directive regarding end-of-life care that is inconsistent with the expression in a POST form, the POST form will take precedence, being treated as a more current expression. Likewise, to the extent inconsistent, a POST form would trump a previously executed do-not-resuscitate order.
  • A POST form expires in one year from the date of creation, or sooner if there is an “unexpected change” in the patient’s medical condition, if the patient moves to a new facility or to a new care level, and if the patient gets a new attending health professional. They may be continued beyond one year upon agreement of the patient or their representative (PAD or Guardian) and the attending medical provider.
  • POST forms would be controlling in institutional care settings, including adult foster care homes; and in the case of an EMS event, outside of institutional care.
  • The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of a POST form. The basis for challenging a POST form would be that the POST form expressions are contrary to the patient’s wishes or best interests.

To read the law, you will want to look at the four House Bills that make up the package of legislation. Most of the law is in House Bill 4070.  Additional changes are in House Bills 4171, 4173 and 4174.  Click on the numbers to read the bills.  What you will see is that the law is mainly in the public health code, with a few conforming changes to EPIC and the Adult Foster Care Licensing Act.

POST forms have been used in some parts of Michigan (without legal authority) for many years. For the record, Jackson County seems to have been the first to implement their usage some 15 years ago.  Other counties have used them for the past few years as part of a pilot program.

POST forms, sometimes referred to as POLST forms (Physician’s Order of Life Sustaining Treatment), are currently in use in several other states. For a good discussion of POST/POLST forms, go to the National POLST Paradigm website by clicking on the name.

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Lay Witness Testimony Regarding Cognitive Impairment

In the recently unpublished Court of Appeals case of Rebecca L. Clemence Revocable Trust (click on name to read the case), the trial judge essentially granted summary disposition in a trust contest case, without summary disposition even having been requested. In doing so, the trial judge expressed frustration that the matter had continued for so long and that, in the judge’s opinion, inadequate evidence of wrongdoing had been discovered.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

What I find helpful about the case is the COA’s discussion of lay witness testimony as evidence regarding incapacity. We have discussed before the growing inclination of court’s to look for medical evidence as the last word on incapacity and vulnerability.  One of the challenges of handling capacity and undue influence cases is that very few people happened to have medical evaluations done contemporaneously with the event in question.

The portion of this case which I will keep in my notes, provides authority for the proposition that the observations of lay witnesses are admissible evidence of incapacity and, if sufficient, can preclude summary disposition. Specifically, this portion of the opinion is on point:

Certainly it would be easier to prove whether Rebecca possessed testamentary capacity or was vulnerable to undue influence if the probate court could review medical records contemporaneous with her estate plan amendment. But such records are not the only method of proof. A lay witness may place his or her opinions into evidence as long as they “are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” MRE 701. And our Supreme Court has specifically found lay opinion testimony admissible to establish a decedent’s testamentary capacity. See In re Moxon’s Estate, 234 Mich 170, 173-173; 207 NW 924 (1926) (holding that a lay witness “who [has] had the opportunity to observe and talk to [the decedent]” may form “impressions” of the decedent’s testamentary capacity and may cite examples for the factfinder’s consideration);

Proving that an older person suffered from cognitive impairments at that time they executed a document being contested is central to nearly every will and trust contest or case of financial exploitation. Lack of Capacity and Undue Influence remain the most common theories of probate and elder law litigation.  These are often fact-rich cases and discovery is frequently extensive.  Trial judges may have limited patience and are under pressure to close cases expeditiously.  Many trial judges also have a strong inclination to require medical evidence in cases where cognitive impairment is a factor, but such evidence is not always available.  As a result, introducing lay testimony to establish cognitive decline is necessary, and often the best evidence available.  In those cases, it is not unusual when presenting such lay witnesses, for the opposing counsel to assert that the lay witness has no medical training and therefore their testimony should not be allowed.  This case supports the proposition that such objections should not prevail.  Lay people can observe behavior in older adults that suggests impairment, and those observations can be admitted and relied upon by a fact-finder.


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Share and Share Alike

This is an unpublished will construction case. To read In Re Estate of Eugenie Dietrich, click on the name.

In other posts (see for instance Who Gets the Grow Lamps?) we’ve seen the problems that arise when attorneys fail to use the precise legal terms of art. In this case, we see the problems that arise when lawyers toss in archaic legal language.

The will says: “To Peter Dietrich and Johann Dietrich, my sons, to be divided between them in equal shares, share and share alike.”

Turns out Johann predeceased Eugenie. So Peter says: “it’s all mine.”  Johann’s issue took exception.  The trial court agreed with Johann’s children, and ordered that they would take their deceased father’s share.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Michigan law strongly favors construction of estate planning instruments that vests the interests of predeceasing family members in their descendants. That’s what our “anti-lapse” rules are for.  See MCL 700.2603.  Those anti-lapse rules however can be rebutted with sufficient evidence of a contrary intent.  This case offers a discussion of class gifts versus individual gifts and the rules of construction that apply, with specific focus on the meaning of the term “share and share alike.”  A good read perhaps for younger lawyers developing their drafting style.

As for the phrase “share and share alike,” I think the lesson is: don’t use it. I’ve seen it many times but have never understood why it would be used when there are better ways of expressing a client’s intentions regarding what is to be done with property if a devisee predeceases.

Perhaps the attraction is that it sounds so fine – so high minded – “share and share alike.” Almost like a blessing- “go forth and prosper,” “live and let live,” “do unto others.” It has that kind of musical or poetic quality.  But our goal in drafting estate planning documents is not to be poetic, rather to be clear.

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Meritless is Good. Frivolous would have been Better.

This is a Chalgian and Tripp case just handed down from the Court of Appeals. Unpublished.  Click here to read In Re Conservatorship of Ueal E. Patrick.

Ueal is a prominent business man in Jackson. He was involved in litigation.  Ueal’s health was declining and the stress of the litigation was making it worse.  In the context of working with him on a separate trust matter, we suggested that it might be beneficial to have his child Mark act as his conservator so that he (Mark) could handle the litigation.  Mark was already deeply involved in the management of the business, and very sophisticated in business matters.  In addition, predating all this was a power of attorney created by Ueal, appointing Mark as his agent, and nominating Mark as conservator should that become necessary.

A hearing was held at which several attorneys were present. The opposing parties did not contest that the appointment of a conservator was appropriate.  They simply opposed the appointment of Mark.  They presented no evidence, called no witnesses, merely made legal arguments.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding Ueal to be a person in need of a conservator, even though they stipulated to it in their pleadings and in court. They argued that the trial court erred by not requiring an independent medical exam be conducted to determine the amount of weight that should be given to Ueal’s nomination of Mark.  And they argued that Mark should not have been appointed because he had a conflict of interest with respect to the other matters being separately litigated.

The COA goes through each of appellant’s arguments, systematically pointing out the deficits in their reasoning. At various points the COA labels their arguments “abandoned,” “without merit,” and “meritless.” I beat up on our COA enough in this forum.  They got this one right.  I appreciate it.

Thanks to our John Mabley for doing an excellent job briefing the case and helping the COA clearly see the deficiencies in appellant’s positions.

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Another Brody Bombshell

This is a published Court of Appeals opinion involving the appointment of a conservator over an adult under EPIC. Click here to read In Re Conservatorship of Rhea Brody.

This case comes out of same family that was involved in the In Re Rhea Brody Living Trust, which case is the topic of the post earlier this month. That prior case dealt with the Rhea Brody Trust, and offered the surprising revelation that a contingent beneficiary of a Trust could contest the actions of the Trustee even while the trust remained revocable.  Click here to read that post.  This second Brody case deals with the appointment of a conservator for Ms. Brody.

The litigants in the case are aligned similarly. In the Trust matter, husband and son were aligned in defending the removal of husband as Trustee, which arose as a result of favorable business dealings between the husband as trustee and the son; which dealings were perceived as being done to the detriment of the daughter, a contingent beneficiary.  In this case, husband and son oppose appointment of a conservator, which appointment is supported by daughter.  The court appointed an attorney who was also acting as Trustee of Rhea’s Trust to serve as her conservator.  The COA affirms.

The husband, as appellant, contests pretty much every aspect of the trial court’s decision, except the finding that Rhea was incompetent. The conclusions of the COA are intriguing.  Look for this case to be cited often by litigators seeking to impose conservators and desiring to by-pass priorities of appointment.  To some extent, perhaps a large extent, this case is the counter balance to In Re Bittner, a relatively recent published opinion addressed in the post “Bittner’s Bite” (click on name to read that post).  In Bittner, the COA chastised a trial judge for imposing a conservator where the requirements of EPIC were not met.  Here, the COA goes to great lengths to justify the appointment over seemingly problematic facts.

One issue relates to whether the evidence supported the finding that appointment of a conservator was necessary to provide for management of assets and avoid waste. In this case the evidence is that husband was agent under a valid POA for Rhea, and further, that all of her assets (except one IRA) were joint with husband.  Further, husband alleges that the IRA was set up to make minimum required distributions annually.  The basis for finding necessity appears to be the conclusion that husband wasn’t really managing these matters, but rather that he had “abdicated” his role to the son, and that son was a potentially devious manipulator of the situation.  The COA goes so far as to suggest that the appointment of a conservator was necessary so that someone independent could review the tax returns.

Which leads to another conclusion of law by the COA in this matter: that the appointment of a conservator does not require a finding that there has been waste of assets, only that such waste could occur in the future. So reasonably founded speculation is enough.

Additionally, and perhaps most concerning, are the findings of the COA with respect to the priority of appointment. The COA cites MCL 700.5409(1)(a)  for the proposition that an independent fiduciary has priority over a spouse and agent under a POA where the POA nominates the agent as conservator. MCL 700.5409(1)(a) says:

(1) The court may appoint an individual, a corporation authorized to exercise fiduciary powers, or a professional conservator described in section 5106 to serve as conservator of a protected individual’s estate. The following are entitled to consideration for appointment in the following order of priority:

(a) A conservator, guardian of property, or similar fiduciary appointed or recognized by the appropriate court of another jurisdiction in which the protected individual resides.

I have always understood this section to mean that a conservator previously appointed by another court would have priority. In this case, the COA seems to say that a professional fiduciary appointed as Trustee over the ward’s Trust by this same Court meets that definition.  The COA states:

Under MCL 700.5409, a protected individual’s spouse is entitled to consideration for appointment as conservator, and is granted priority over all other individuals except “[a] conservator, guardian of property, or similar fiduciary appointed or recognized by the appropriate court of another jurisdiction in which the protected individual resides,” MCL 700.5409(1)(a), and “[a]n individual or corporation nominated by the protected individual if he or she is 14 years of age or older and of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice, including a nomination made in a durable power of attorney,” MCL 700.5409(1)(b). As Rhea’s husband, Robert was an individual entitled to priority consideration. However, Robert was not entitled to consideration unless the probate court considered an independent fiduciary and found him or her unsuitable. Lyneis, as trustee and independent fiduciary, had statutory priority over Robert, despite Robert’s marriage to Rhea. MCL 700.5409(1).

Wait – WHAT? Where is the other jurisdiction?

Further, and maybe even more unsettling, the COA says:

The statute’s priority classifications are merely a guide for the probate court’s exercise of discretion.

Really?  This statement seems to fly in the face of a long line of cases that require a finding of unsuitability – including, perhaps ironically, the case of In re Guardianship of Dorothy Redd, which is the topic of the other post I wrote today, a case issued by a separate panel of the COA on the same date as this matter.

That said, the COA goes on to say that the husband is unsuitable, again, because the son is a manipulative fellow and may use his influence over husband to Rhea’s detriment in the future.

There are other issues addressed in this case, but I think I’ve hit the ones that seem most significant, and that are those most likely to be cited by litigators in the future.

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Seeing Redd

Here’s another important published opinion on the topic of adult guardianships. The case is about the removal of a guardian of an adult ward appointed under EPIC.

The case deals with the very common, and therefore very important, situation in which a guardian is using its position to undermine healthy family relations. In this case, the facts relied upon by the trial court and the COA are that the existing guardian was actively interfering with visitations, and taking steps to cause the ward to be distrustful of other family members.  These alienation cases go on all the time.  It is helpful to have an opinion that clarifies that such behavior is a basis for removal of a fiduciary.  It is likely that this case will be cited frequently where such facts arise, and I suspect that the finding that such behavior disqualifies a guardian will be offered by extension to cases involving conservators and other fiduciaries.  And that’s good.  We need this law.

So basically the trial court removed a guardian for the reason that he was undermining family relations, and the COA affirms. Click here to read In re Guardianship of Dorothy Redd.

In reaching its decision, the COA holds that the standard for removal is “suitable and willing to serve.” This finding is an important clarification of MCL 700.5310 which is silent on the requirement for removal.

The COA also finds that the standard of proof for removing a guardian for unsuitability is not clear and convincing evidence, but rather a preponderance. Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion the COA indicates that the standard for proving unsuitability in the initial appointment hearing is clear and convincing evidence.  This reading of the priorities in a guardianship proceedings seems inconsistent with the conclusions regarding priorities and unsuitability reached by a separate panel discussing these issues in the context of a conservatorship, as addressed in my other post of today’s date regarding In Re Conservatorship of Rhea Brody.

So, it’s a big day in the world of litigating guardianships and conservatorships. These two published cases (Brody II and Redd) will be cited in the future, each for their own important conclusions of law.  Probate litigation in the age of living to be 100, where the fun never ends.

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Remainder Beneficiary of Revocable Trust has Standing to Sue Trustee for Breach

Several issues are addressed in this published opinion regarding a family trust contest that occurs while Mom, settlor, is living. Mom’s trust is revocable and Dad is Trustee.  Mom may or may not be competent at the time of the litigation, hence the Trust may or may not have become irrevocable.

To read In Re Rhea Brody Living Trust click here.

The most interesting issue addressed in the opinion is whether Daughter, a residual beneficiary of a trust that remains revocable, has standing to contest the administrative actions of the Trustee. Mom’s Trust provides for both son and daughter to receive equal shares upon the death of survivor of herself and Dad.  Daughter says the sale, by Dad/Trustee, of certain business interests to Son and his children is a breach of his fiduciary duty to her and violates the requirement that he appoint an independent co-Trustee to engage in any action that alters the interests of beneficiaries.  The COA says Daughter, as reidual beneficiary, has standing as an “interested person” under EPIC pursuant to MCL 7.7201 to contest Trustee/Dad’s actions as Trustee which would ultimately affect her interest if the Trust if it is not subsequently amended to remove her.  It rejects the contention that standing is controlled by the “real party in interest” rule set forth in MCR 2.201(c). The COA holds that this would be true regardless of whether Mom is or isn’t competent (that is, regardless of whether trust has or has not become irrevocable).  This is an important clarification of the law, and would presumably mean that Daughter could have sued Mom/Settlor for doing the same thing if Mom were acting as her own Trustee.  (Of course, if that were the case, Mom could simply amend the Trust and make the issue moot.)

Further complicating the analysis is the fact that the Trust provides that if Dad survives Mom, Dad as Trustee may make unequal distributions to the two children. Accordingly Dad and Son argue that this means no harm was done to Daughter even if the sale reduced her expectancy interest in the Trust.  The COA however notes that Dad has not survived Mom and therefore those provisions are not in play.  The COA goes further (perhaps dicta), to conclude that notwithstanding the unequal distribution provisions, the overall intent of the Trust is equal division between children and therefore the actions of Trustee/Dad could be a breach.  The trial court in fact found his actions to be a breach and ruled in favor of daughter on summary disposition.

The COA also provides an interesting analysis of the remedies directed by the trial court regarding two sales that were the basis of the litigation. The trial court ordered reformation of the contract on one sale and rescinded the other.  The COA found that while rescission was an appropriate remedy, reformation was not.  In remanding the reformation portion of the trial court’s order, the COA offers an important explanation of the limitations of a court’s equitable powers.

Finally, and least importantly (although this is the first issue addressed in the opinion), this case looks at subject matter jurisdiction of business courts in relation to probate courts. Dad/Trustee argued that the litigation discussed above was improperly filed in probate court because all business litigation is required to be brought in the “business court.” The COA finds that there is a conflict between the statutes controlling business court and probate court subject matter jurisdiction, but concludes that the probate court does not lose subject matter jurisdiction over trust cases simply because the litigation involves issues related to business interests.  The COA notes that this confusion is temporary for the reason that the business court jurisdiction statute was recently amended to further limit the jurisdiction of business courts to cases in which a business entity is a party.  That change becomes effective October 11 2017.

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