PR Appointment for Estate with No Assets

Here’s a case that’s worth filing away for those who do probate litigation and estate administration. It’s unpublished, but addresses an issue that comes up not infrequently.  The holding is that a probate court cannot deny a petition to appoint a personal representative on the grounds that the estate has no assets.

In In Re Estate of Janet Kapp (click on name to read case), the trial court denied a petition to appoint a personal representative on the grounds that there were no known assets to be administered. The COA reversed and remanded, holding that there is no basis in EPIC to support the trial court’s decision.  The COA says:

Instead, the court concluded that the appointment of a personal representative was unnecessary because there were no assets in the estate to probate.  In doing so, however, the probate court did not cite statutory authority that allows a court to deny the appointment of a nominated personal representative on those grounds.  To the contrary, a court rule provides that personal representatives do not need to provide notice to creditors when “[t]he estate has no assets[.]” MCR 5.208(D)(3)(a). It follows that personal representatives can be appointed even when the estate has no assets.

There are many reasons to open an estate which have nothing to do with distribution of assets. This is a good decision, and although unpublished, should provide an outline for the argument when attorneys are faced with this misunderstanding in their cases.

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Policy Tweaks Scare Medicaid Geeks

When it comes to Medicaid planning, truly the devil is in the details; and the “details” are found in the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) policy manuals, most often the Bridges Eligibility Manual (the “BEM”). MDHHS has announced several language revisions to a variety of BEM items, all taking effect October 1.  Folks that have been in this game long enough know that such revisions often mean mischief and that, especially during this haunted season, odds are high that there will be more tricks than treats in this bag of goodies.

Waiver Rewrite (BEM 106)

The Medicaid Waiver program (aka “the MI Choice Program”) allows persons qualified for long term care Medicaid benefits to receive services in their homes. Waiver benefits have been around awhile now, but the way the eligibility rules apply to Waiver have remained uncertain.  As of October 1, the Waiver eligibility rules will be much better organized and laid out in much more detail in the new BEM 106.  That’s a treat.

Among the clarifications are the rules for how an initial asset assessment (the “IAA”) is triggered for Waiver applicants, and how a divestment penalty is triggered. These clarifications raise concerns.

The IAA is important because it provides the date which is used for a married person to calculate their protected spousal amount (aka “community spouse resource allowance”). For traditional Medicaid long term care programs, the IAA is triggered when someone enters the hospital or a long term care facility for at least 30 days.  Now, for Waiver applicants, the IAA can also be triggered when the Medicaid applicant has begun:

Receiving appropriate home and community based services specified under the approved state waiver; see Exhibit I in this item. They do not have to receive these services from a waiver agent listed below, but the services must be received from a person or entity certified (or licensed) by the state to provide the services. See below for verification of services received.

So, it seems that a person can now trigger their own Medicaid Waiver IAA date by hiring in-home caregivers (or perhaps it will have to be nurses) that are licensed by the State. That seems to give people, and perhaps planners, more control over the IAA trigger date and may be a treat.  We’ll see.  Cautious optimism here.

Of greater concern in the new BEM 106 is the language that relates to the trigger for the divestment penalty and the way that intersects with the language defining “approved for waiver.” What is says is that the divestment penalty begins “on the date which all criteria listed under the approved for waiver section in this item has been confirmed.”  The “Approved for Waiver” section provides the following:

Approved for the waiver means:

  • The agent conducted the assessment, and
  • There is an available wavier slot for the individual’s placement and
  • A person-centered plan of service has been developed and
  • The participant received, or expects to receive, supports coordination services from the agent with appropriate waiver services for at least 30 consecutive days.

The agent determines the waiver approval date and termination date. The agent is responsible for advising the appropriate local Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) office of these dates. The agent is responsible for advising the appropriate local MDHHS office the dates of enrollment and disenrollment information in CHAMPS.

This seems to leave all control in the hands of the Waiver Agent, and will also depend on slot availability. This will make divestment planning strategies for Waiver clients much less predictable.  Definitely room for mischief here. Call this a trick.

Assets (BEM 400)

As of October 1, the language in BEM 400 that allows real estate to be considered unavailable during periods in which the property is listed for sale has been tweaked in three respects.

First, the policy has been modified by the addition of the following sentence: “If after a length of time has passed without a sale, the sale price may need to be evaluated against the definition of fair market value.”

Second, it now says “The asset becomes countable when a reasonable offer is received.”

Third, the non-salable exemption will not be applied to the initial asset assessment (IAA).

While none of these changes seem particularly egregious, one always wonders why DHHS would go through the trouble to include them if there isn’t some hidden agenda. But then maybe I’ve become too cynical.

The October 1 changes to BEM 400 also include beefed up language to clarify that assets remains an available resources during periods in which the applicant is waiting for a conservator (or guardian) to be appointed. So even though you may have no power of attorney or other legal ability to spend down or otherwise qualify for Medicaid, the fact that the assets exist is all that matters.  The cost of the delay of obtaining court authority falls on the applicant.  That has always been the rule. So, again, one is curious about the need for these clarifications.

Divestment (BEM 405)

BEM 405 now includes an eerily vague and portentous provision that says: “purchasing an asset which decreases the group’s net worth and is not in the group’s financial interest” is a transfer of assets, and apparently also per se “divestment.” Definitely an invitation to mischief and definitely a trick.

Divestment policy will now define “putting assets or income into a Limited Liability Company (LLC)” as a transfer of assets which presumably means it can be analyzed as possible divestment. A trick.

BEM 405 policy has been clarified to address situations where past divestment activity is subsequently discovered and reported. The new language provides that the penalty period starts on the “first day after timely notice is given.”  Maybe not a treat, but I’m ok with this.

Conclusion

There are other tweaks to the aforementioned BEMs and tweaks to other BEMs not discussed above, but these seem to me the most curious. To read the entire bulletin with links to the policy, click here.  Happy Halloween.

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Unpublished Decision Demonstrates Difficulties Inherent in Setting Aside Settlements

The process by which this issue arises is somewhat confusing, but basically the facts are that:

Parent has two children. Original trust leaves residue to his children 50-50; and if either child predeceases, the share of predeceased child goes to the descendants of the deceased child.

One child dies and then the parent becomes demented, subject to guardianship and conservatorship. Conservator petitions the trial court for instruction on the validity of a trust amendment which may or may not have been signed. No signed copy is found. The purported amendment was made after the death of the child, and if valid, would leave the entire residue to the surviving child and nothing to the descendants of the deceased child.

Matter is mediated and the surviving child and descendants of the deceased child reach an agreement regarding the division of the residue, which agreement is approved by the trial court.

Subsequently, the child who would have received everything under the purported trust amendment announces that he has found the signed amendment, and seeks to set aside the order approving the settlement pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1).

The trial court denies the motion to set aside the order, and the Court of Appeals affirms.

In Re Frank M. Lambrecht, Jr. Trust (click on name to read the case) is unpublished, but I think it does a reasonably good job looking at what it takes to set aside a settlement agreement, and probably gets the right result in what is no doubt a very close case.

There are several grounds on which the agreement (or more accurately, the court order adopting the agreement) is challenged, all of which come under MCR 2.612(C)(1).

MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a) – Mutual Mistake.  Court of Appeals holds that while it may well have been a mutual mistake of a material fact that no signed amendment existed, the parties all knew that it was possible that one might subsequently be found, and that possibility was presumably factored into the value they placed on the case when they settled.  So, unlike some other types of orders, an order approving a settlement agreement has already factored in the possibility of this type of mistake = no relief here.

MCR 2.612(C)(1)(b) – After Discovered Material Evidence.  The Court of Appeals says that the child challenging the settlement agreement is correct that the discovery of the signed amendment would meet most of the requirements necessary to obtain relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(b), but on these facts this contesting child fails to meet the burden of showing that it could not have been found with “reasonable diligence.”   The child seeking relief says the signed amendment was found in his parent’s desk drawer, but that he chose not to look there while his parent was alive, out of respect for that parent’s privacy.  Basically, his deference on this point may have been admirable but does not obviate his obligation to use due diligence.  There is no question he had access, and presumably the desk drawer would have been an obvious place to look.  So that won’t work.

MCR 2.612(C)(1)(e) and (f) – No Longer Equitable and Other Grounds for Relief.  The Court of Appeals notes that the settlement was not solely based on the fact that a signed amendment was missing. Rather, the settlement negotiations included other issues, including whether, even if the signed amendment were found, the amendment would be set aside for lack of capacity or undue influence.  In light of the other variables in play during the settlement process, it could not be said that the resulting agreement is no longer fair.

Conclusion. This case neatly presents the issue of how and why an order approving a settlement agreement is different from other types of court orders when it comes to seeking relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1); and neatly applies the law to facts that make the decision a close call on several grounds.

 

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VA Program Adds Divestment Rules and More

The so-called “Aid and Attendance” pension has become an important source of income for older adults needing long term care services, and an important source of business for some elder law attorneys. The program is offered through the Veterans Administration.  Eligibility requires military service during a period of conflict, or being the spouse or surviving spouse of a veteran that meets that requirement. In addition, there are asset and income eligibility rules. Those income and asset rules will change dramatically with the implementation of new regulations formally adopted today (but taking effect in 30 days).

There are several changes. Some of the more notable changes are outlined below. Before I get into those, I think it would be helpful to acknowledge the context of these changes and the overriding themes that tie them together.

First, it seems evident that these new rules are a reaction to the role of lawyers and financial planners who, for the past ten years or so, have become increasingly involved in “helping” veterans qualify for these benefits. The VA clearly perceives this development as harmful to the program and perhaps even exploitative towards the veterans.

Second, this VA benefit is often considered by older adults who need help with aging issues, as something available either in addition to, or as an alternative to, applying for long term care benefits through Medicaid. For historical reasons, these two programs have had very different financial (asset and income) eligibility rules.  These changes make the VA benefit rules more like the Medicaid eligibility rules.

 

Divestment. Divestment means giving away your assets (or taking other steps to artificially reduce their availability) in order to qualify for the benefit. Heretofore, there was no penalty if an applicant gave away resources in order to qualify for this VA benefit.  Now there will be.  Most Medicaid long term care programs have had divestment rules for at least 20 years.

Like the Medicaid long term care programs, penalties for asset transfers will result in periods of ineligibility the duration of which will be a function of the amount sheltered. Whereas the so-called “look back period” for Medicaid is five years, the look-back for this program will be three years.

Use of trusts and annuities in planning can result in divestment analysis under these new rules.

There are exceptions, and interestingly there is an exception for elders who were taken advantage of by an advisor who was marketing services purportedly designed to allow them to qualify for this benefit. Or, in other words, if an attorney told you to put your assets in an irrevocable trust or annuity, and now, as a result, you are ineligible for benefits, you merely have to assert that the lawyer was a charlatan to avoid the penalty (at least that how I read it).

Homestead Exemption. Both this VA benefit and Medicaid have historically exempted the primary residence from consideration as a countable asset.  In recent years, Medicaid has placed a limit on the value of an exempt homestead.  Now VA will limit the exempt homestead by using a different measurement – two acres.

Countable Asset Limit.  The amount of exempt assets that have historically been excluded for this VA benefit has been uncertain.  While some offices used a “rule of thumb” figure at times, the real rule required a calculation taking into account the income shortfall of the applicant, their life expectancy and their available resources.  Medicaid has long had a simple $2,000 rule for single people, and a formula for married persons, with a ceiling.  That Medicaid formula is called the Community Spouse Resource Allowance (or CSRA) (also sometimes called the “protected spousal amount”).  Each year the Medicaid program announces the maximum CSRA. In 2018, the maximum CSRA is $123,600.  VA has adopted, as their new asset limit for all applicants, the Medicaid maximum CSRA.

 

Conclusion. These are dramatic changes for lawyers who offer advice on this benefit.  There are other changes.  Above are those that I perceive as most notable.  To read more:  click here to read the rule changes as they were originally published in 2015 (yes it has been around that long); and click here to read the VA commentary that accompanied the announcement that the rule changes would finally be implemented today.

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Terror Clause Canaries Don’t Fly

In this unpublished decision from the Court of Appeals, a potential litigant filed a “petition for instruction” which asked the trial judge to decide the question of: If a subsequent petition to modify the trust were filed, whether such a petition would be deemed to violate the trust’s terror clause and thereby cause petitioner to forfeit her interest in the trust?

Click here to read: In Re Robert E. Whitton Revocable Trust

Curiously, a trial judge saw fit to issue such an opinion. In this case, the trial court determined that the petition for instruction did not itself violate the terror clause, but that a subsequent petition to modify the trust would violate the clause and that the petitioner had no probable cause to bring that petition.

A terror clause (aka “no contest clause”) is a provision in a will or trust that says a beneficiary will be penalized (typically the penalty is to lose their interest in the estate) if they contest the will or trust at issue.

Michigan law on terror clauses is pretty straightforward and is spelled out in MCL 700.7113 (for trusts) an in MCL 700.2518 and 700.3905 (for wills). (click on the statutes to read them). They are generally enforceable, but will not be enforced in cases where the party had “probable cause” to initiate the proceeding.

Litigants, like the one in this case, have long attempted is to come up with a way of having a court determine whether they will be penalized if they bring an action before actually doing so. They want to know in advance whether they will be deemed to have triggered the terror clause if they file a petition being contemplated.  These efforts don’t work.  Several years ago, the Court of Appeals issued a published decision in a case handled by our firm in which it declared that trial courts lack authority to rule on such speculative matters for the reasons that the issue is non-justiciable (not ripe, as it were).  Click here to read that prior post.  Basically, the appellate courts have said that if you want to contest a document, you have to take your chances.  So, it’s no surprise that the Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide this case, and vacated that part of the trial court’s decision.  And it’s curious that, in light of the clear law on this point, the trial judge in this matter thought that such an action could be decided.

This case also offers the opportunity to discuss another, perhaps dicier, aspect of our terror clause statutes, which is that the imposition of a penalty is not necessarily limited to proceedings in which the validity of document at issue is being contested. Rather these statutes indicate that a terror clause can be written to impose a penalty for initiating any type of proceeding relating to the trust or will.  So, in this case, the anticipated subsequent petition was being framed as a “petition to modify” a trust to conform with an amendment that the settlor had purportedly had drafted, but never got around to signing.  The appellants in this case were hoping to escape the imposition of the terror clause penalty on the idea that the subsequent petition they were considering wouldn’t actually (per their argument) contest the validity of the trust, but would only inquire as to the validity of an unsigned amendment.  Likewise the respondents in this matter argued that the act of bringing a petition for instruction was itself a violation of the terror clause.  The point of all this is that Michigan law allows for very broad terror clause provisions, including, presumably, a provision that would penalize a litigant for bringing a petition for instruction, or that says a petition seeking to recognize an unsigned amendment is a violation. The opinion in this case indicates only that the terror clause in this trust was “lengthy.”  It is not clear what the scope of this lengthy terror clause is, but it is seems possible at least that a terror clause could have been written which would have been unambiguous on these specific issues.

So, the points here are that (1) There are no terror clause canaries – no free bites at the apple. When a terror clause is in play, you take your chances.  And (2) A terror clause may be written to impose a penalty for initiating any form of proceeding which relates to the will or trust at issue.  The scope of the terror clause itself is significant in deciding how to proceed in cases where these provisions are in play.

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COA on Brody Trust Remand: We Were Both Right

In what should be the last chapter in the Rhea Brody Trust saga, the Court of Appeals has released its decision resulting from a Michigan Supreme Court Order remanding the case to the COA.  As previously discussed here, confusion was created by the first Brody Trust decision (“Brody I”) regarding whether a child/beneficiary has standing to initiate litigation involving a parent’s revocable trust regardless of whether the parent/settlor is still competent.

To read the new Brody case, click here.

To read prior posts on this case, click here and here.

In Brody Trust I, the COA held that a child who is a beneficiary of a revocable trust may have standing to initiate litigation regarding the administration of a revocable trust, regardless of whether the parent/settlor is competent. The COA relied upon the definition of an “interested person” as set forth in MCL 700.1105(c).  That decision shocked the probate community, and caused the probate section of the state bar to file an amicus brief asking the Michigan Supreme Court to reverse that holding.  [The probate section did not ask for a reversal of the outcome of Brody I, because based on the facts of the case, and specifically the fact that the settlor was in fact incompetent, and the trustee was also the settlor’s agent under a power of attorney, standing would exist under MCL 700.7603(2).]  Click on the statute to read those laws.

The MSC accepted briefs on appeal, but rather than hear and decide the case, the MSC simply vacated controversial portions of Brody I and remanded it to the COA for a new and improved opinion.

Now, the new opinion (“Brody II”) has been issued.  In it, the COA acknowledges that the probate section was correct in asserting that MCL 700.7603(2) would apply in this case and that the application of that statute would provide standing to the petitioner/child/beneficiary. But – and it’s kind of a big but – they say that they were not wrong in their application of MCL 700.1105(c).

Litigators Rejoice?

Brody II is published, so it is the law. What this means, it seems, is that under MCL 700.1105(c), depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, a probate court could find that a child or beneficiary of a revocable trust might have standing to initiate litigation regarding the administration of a revocable trust even where the settlor remains competent and could amend the trust and cut out complaining child/beneficiary.  Is this a boon for litigators?  Possibly, but I think probably not.  Probate courts have discretion under the second sentence of 700.1105(c) to determine who would be an interested person in any particular proceeding, and that decision is based on the “particular purposes of, and matter involved in” the litigation.  Presumably, it would be a rare set of circumstances where a trial court would want to exercise their discretion to allow litigation by an aggrieved child or beneficiary in cases where the settlor can speak for themselves.  Presumably also, competent settlors who are offended by having their children and/or other beneficiaries initiate litigation, will in fact amend their documents and resolve the issue that way.

Conclusion

So, the COA missed the obvious way to resolve this case in Brody I, and they acknowledge that Brody II. But they don’t just leave it at that.  By taking the “we were both right” approach, they allow for the possibility of future litigation initiated by children or beneficiaries of revocable trusts while the settlor is competent.

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Michipremes Ponder the Space between Absent and Divorced

The Michigan Supreme Court has ventured back into probate law, this time to explain the rules for determining what it takes to prove that one spouse was “willfully absent” from the other pursuant to MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i). It’s another lengthy opinion, and again there is significant division among the Justices.

In Michigan, if a married person dies, their surviving spouse has certain statutory financial rights in the probate estate of the deceased spouse. That is, unless the surviving spouse was “willfully absent” from the deceased spouse for a year or more before the death.

The facts of this case are that James married Maggie in 1968. They had four children together.  In 1976, Maggie packed up the kids, moved out and successfully sued James for support.  The two lived apart, although both in the same town (Saginaw), up until James died in 2012.  The trial court found that Maggie was still adequately connected to James throughout their 36 year separation so that it could not be said she was willfully absent.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-3 decision.

Much of the majority opinion focuses on facts of this particular case, which the majority weaves to construct a story whereby the 36 year absence is portrayed as something short of a willful absence.  [I love it that the majority counts it as evidence of their continued emotional connection that James consented to the support order – rather than have a trial and possibly face a higher amount.  Or that he joined Maggie in a suit to allow her to continue to receive healthcare benefits through his employer – when presumably his support payments would have increased had she been cut off.]

The dissent, joined by three justices, argues that the majority has stretched the meaning of the word “absent” beyond reason.

Ultimately however, the case of In Re Estate of James Erwin Sr. will stand for the proposition that:

Absence in this context presents a factual inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances, and courts should evaluate whether complete physical and emotional absence existed, resulting in an end to the marriage for practical purposes. The burden is on the party challenging an individual’s status as a surviving spouse to show that he or she was “willfully absent,” physically and emotionally, from the decedent spouse.

To read In Re Estate of James Erwin,, Sr. click here.

Congrats to friend and colleague Valerie Kutz-Otway for prevailing despite some clearly difficult facts.

XXX TURN BACK NOW XXX

Supplemental Ramblings

Ok, these cases are kind of interesting in a sociological sort of way, right? And the courts didn’t create this problem. The legislature made this an issue by deciding that divorce isn’t the only line that matters; and by giving it a name (“willfully absent”) that suggests ill will or selfishness. So there’s a country music quality to the whole thing that invites gender stereotypes and morality judgments.

Remember Arbutus and Lyle? (click here for a refresher)

Maggie is different than Arbutus but the same. Both are seemingly good women who did what they had to do to get by. Arbutus was a good hearted woman lovin’ a good timin’ man (she loved him in spite of his wicked ways that she don’t understand). Maggie’s story is less developed, but the suggestion is that she did what she had to do for herself and their children and that she would have stood by her man, if he had only been a better husband.

So maybe this is really a gender stereotype thing. Would James have been treated as surviving spouse as to Maggie’s estate?  Would the Court have gone to such lengths to find a sufficiently adequate emotional connection to give him a bite out of her life savings?  Seems unlikely to me. His wife left him and took the kids, then had to sue him for support.

Or maybe this is just about sex. What if Arbutus or Maggie had gone off and shacked up with some other guys?  Would the court feel so warm and fuzzy towards these women, or would their sexual liberation be a bar to their rights?

So when this issue arises, we face something like a common law divorce trial, one where fault is a relevant inquiry. Is this helpful or necessary where we already have a clear line of married or divorced?  But, as I say, the legislature created this situation, not the courts.  In fact, by maximizing the circumstances in which someone can be found to not be willfully absent, that is, by minimizing the space between willful absence and divorce, the MSC has probably done all it can to discourage litigation in this arena.

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Divestment Rules for Medicaid Waiver Clarified – Maybe

A policy bulletin has been issued by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services which provides additional direction on when and how a divestment penalty period runs for persons otherwise eligible of Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver services (aka the ”MIChoice” program).

Click here to read the policy bulletin, which takes effect October 1, 2018.

The point of the policy seems to be that under federal law there was uncertainty about how to start a divestment penalty period running for persons in waiver programs, like MIChoice. The source of this clarification is a federal directive to state Medicaid directors that explains why there is perceived confusion about this issue.  In fact, I think the federal letter does a better job of explaining the issue than the State Policy Bulletin.  Click here to read that letter.

In any event, the powers that be have decided that the penalty period begins to run when the person applying for MIChoice services is deemed otherwise eligible for the program, which is a four part test:

  • determined that the applicant meets financial and non-financial requirements for Medicaid;
  • determined that the applicant meets the level of care criteria for the 1915(c) waivers;
  • determined that the applicant has an individual person-centered service plan in place; and
  • confirmed there is an available waiver slot for the applicant’s placement.

Well, BEM 405, page 14, already says:

The penalty period starts on the date which the individual is eligible for Medicaid and would otherwise be receiving institutional level care (LTC, MIChoice waiver, or home help or home health services), and is not already part of a penalty period.

As far as I can tell, this current Michigan policy seems to be in line with the new proposed policy. It certainly seems consistent with the federal directive, which simply says:

the penalty period start date for a 217 applicant is no later than the point at which a 217 applicant would otherwise be receiving HCBS waiver coverage based on an approved application for such care but for a penalty

If you want to worry about something, you might look to the State’s decision to include the requirement that there be an open slot to start the penalty running. That might prove challenging for planners in the future.

So, in the end, I’m not sure how things change with this new policy, or if they really do. Nonetheless BEM 405 will presumably be rewritten to conform with the bulletin and those who practice in this area may run into snags, or avoid snags, as a result.

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Phone App “document” is a Valid Will in Michigan

It happened and it’s published.

The Michigan Court of Appeals held, in a published decision, that a paragraph posted by a decedent on his phone is a valid will under Michigan law, and specifically, MCL 700.2503.

We’ve discussed Michigan’s uniquely liberal law regarding instruments intended to be wills before. See, for instance, Section 2503 Grows Up (click on name).

In this case, Duane Horton wrote a note in his journal stating that his testamentary wishes could be found on his phone app. They looked and they found it.  The trial court admitted the electronic expression as the decedent’s will under MCL 700.2503. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Click here to read In re Estate of Duane Francis Horton, II

It’s an important case as it further fleshes out the impact of Michigan’s cutting edge law.

First, it dismisses the number one misconception about Section 2503, which is that it is intended only to fix “minor, technical deficiencies” in documents that would otherwise be admissible as holographic wills or otherwise. The COA holds that the statute doesn’t say that, and doesn’t mean that.  Rather Section 2503 is a stand alone, separate process for admitting testamentary expressions which does not require any formality, only clear and convincing evidence of intent.

Equally important, the case stands for the proposition that an electronic document is a “document” for the purposes of this statute.

These are powerful developments in probate law, and, for better or worse, Michigan seems to be on the cutting edge. Fun issues, fun times.

 

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