In what should be the last chapter in the Rhea Brody Trust saga, the Court of Appeals has released its decision resulting from a Michigan Supreme Court Order remanding the case to the COA. As previously discussed here, confusion was created by the first Brody Trust decision (“Brody I”) regarding whether a child/beneficiary has standing to initiate litigation involving a parent’s revocable trust regardless of whether the parent/settlor is still competent.
In Brody Trust I, the COA held that a child who is a beneficiary of a revocable trust may have standing to initiate litigation regarding the administration of a revocable trust, regardless of whether the parent/settlor is competent. The COA relied upon the definition of an “interested person” as set forth in MCL 700.1105(c). That decision shocked the probate community, and caused the probate section of the state bar to file an amicus brief asking the Michigan Supreme Court to reverse that holding. [The probate section did not ask for a reversal of the outcome of Brody I, because based on the facts of the case, and specifically the fact that the settlor was in fact incompetent, and the trustee was also the settlor’s agent under a power of attorney, standing would exist under MCL 700.7603(2).] Click on the statute to read those laws.
The MSC accepted briefs on appeal, but rather than hear and decide the case, the MSC simply vacated controversial portions of Brody I and remanded it to the COA for a new and improved opinion.
Now, the new opinion (“Brody II”) has been issued. In it, the COA acknowledges that the probate section was correct in asserting that MCL 700.7603(2) would apply in this case and that the application of that statute would provide standing to the petitioner/child/beneficiary. But – and it’s kind of a big but – they say that they were not wrong in their application of MCL 700.1105(c).
Brody II is published, so it is the law. What this means, it seems, is that under MCL 700.1105(c), depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, a probate court could find that a child or beneficiary of a revocable trust might have standing to initiate litigation regarding the administration of a revocable trust even where the settlor remains competent and could amend the trust and cut out complaining child/beneficiary. Is this a boon for litigators? Possibly, but I think probably not. Probate courts have discretion under the second sentence of 700.1105(c) to determine who would be an interested person in any particular proceeding, and that decision is based on the “particular purposes of, and matter involved in” the litigation. Presumably, it would be a rare set of circumstances where a trial court would want to exercise their discretion to allow litigation by an aggrieved child or beneficiary in cases where the settlor can speak for themselves. Presumably also, competent settlors who are offended by having their children and/or other beneficiaries initiate litigation, will in fact amend their documents and resolve the issue that way.
So, the COA missed the obvious way to resolve this case in Brody I, and they acknowledge that Brody II. But they don’t just leave it at that. By taking the “we were both right” approach, they allow for the possibility of future litigation initiated by children or beneficiaries of revocable trusts while the settlor is competent.